“Doubtless, we are several, and I am not as alone as I sometimes say . . .”
— Jacques Derrida, Envois
I
I will begin by identifying an interlocutor named “Jeremy Stewart”, whose book, I, Daniel: An Illegitimate Reading of Jacques Derrida's 'Envois', cites Derrida — “Doubtless, we are several, and I am not as alone as I sometimes say . . .”— page 107. I will begin with a name, a text, and a quotation while acknowledging that my “I” includes others. One of these others took a photo of the above passage a few years ago when poring through Derrida’s Envois, and perhaps it was she who recognized Jeremy’s quotation.
On the same day, a framed photograph fell off the wall and the glass shattered all over the hardwood. I took a photo of this as well, and worked it into a poem that will be published in a book at the end of next month. When coming across Jeremy’s quotation, “recognition” occurred as an immediate perceptual awareness of absence. I felt something was missing, and the feeling chased me into a lingering and somewhat corrosive curiosity. I took my dog for a walk and remembered the photo. Having admitted these coincidences (the photo of the quotation and the broken photo frame), I won’t “begin” again. There is no reason to convince you that beginnings must be rich and verbose. Nothing immaculate exists. No immaculate is actual. “I know what this costs.”
II
In writing about books I have read, or books I have written, or projected works in draft, it is easy to confuse what I have said publicly—- whether spoken or published— with what I have written and left unfinished. There are traces of such things, and it hurts (stings, smarts, burns) to discover that the words remain hidden in my notebooks, severaled in silence.
Uncertainty is where relationship possibilitizes itself, as such, every relationship of value alters its subjects irrevocably, giving them a knowledge that could not have been gained elsewhere. A knowledge about themselves. The touch deforms us, and thus makes us more real, laying the weight of the world in proximity to our bodies and our experience of embodiment. To be touched by another simultaneously wounds us and recreates us.
Derrida said something similar of poetry in a late essay: “No poem without accident, no poem that does not open itself like a wound, but no poem that is not also just as wounding. You will call the poem a silent incantation, the aphonic wound that, of you, from you, I want to learn by heart… The poem falls to me, benediction, coming of (of from) the other.”
Traces allude to the wound without speaking for the wound, or evidencing it. The trace is not a presence so much as “simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself.” A simulacrum is a representation or imitation of a person or thing.
III
Speaking of inheritance, Derrida: “In my anticipation of death, in my relation to a death to come, a death that I know will completely annihilate me and leave nothing of me behind, there is just below the surface a testamentary desire, a desire that something survive, get left behind or passed on—an inheritance or something that I myself can lay no claim to, that will not return to me, but that will, perhaps, remain.”
IV
Dear reader, forget the photos. Pretend I didn’t mention them. But don’t forget that I lied to you when I scoffed at beginnings and repetition. And don’t forget how I defined recognition in relation to the secret I may have kept.
V
With dinner guests due to arrive in a few hours, I sat in my car in a parking lot where no one could find me and read Peggy Kamuf's essay, "A plus d'un titre," alongside Jeremy’s fabulous monograph, both of which led me to the uncanny moment on September 22, 2001, when Derrida was awarded the Theodore W. Adorno prize in Frankfurt, on this pseudo-date (since the prize was traditionally awarded on September 11 to coincide with Adorno's birthday, which, in this case, coincided with al Qaeda's attack on the World Trade Center in New York).
It was cold in the car, cold enough to warrant gloves and earmuffs, an accessory situation that deranged my note-taking efforts, forcing me to consign some thoughts to memory, most of which did not make it through dinner and the evening. Awarded every three years, the Adorno Prize recognizes work ‘in the spirit of the Frankfurt school’ that spans philosophy, social sciences and the arts. None transgressed these boundaries as consistently and kookily as Jacques Derrida, who, in Tympan, insisted that "it is about this multiplicity, perhaps, that philosophy, being itself situated, inscribed and included there, has never been able to reason."
The multiplicity and polyvocality appears in countless texts, including the post-scriptum of On the Name, where Derrida amends his statement about speech, writing, "More than one, forgive me, one must always be more than one in order to speak, there must be several voices…"
On September 20, 2001, looking out at the audience in Frankfurt, Derrida began his speech, “The language of the foreigner” (as translated by Lucie Elvenin), by recounting a dream spoken by a different voice, a spectre that haunted his own work as well as that of the Frankfurt school. He does this for many reasons, but one of them involves language, particularly the connection between Derrida's French and Walter Benjamin's German. Both men, in this scenario, use languages that are not their 'first languages' in order to communicate an insight. Both men indirectly pose questions about fidelity to language in doing so.
“To open this modest statement of my gratitude, I will read a phrase, which one day, one night, Walter Benjamin dreamt in French,” Derrida tells his audience, adding that Benjamin “entrusted it in French” to Gretel Adorno, who had become the wife of Theodor Adorno by the time this letter was addressed to her on 12 October 1939. Walter and Gretel carried on a lively correspondence prior to her marriage, and those letters to Gretel Karplus present us with a richer, more flirtatious slant of both persons. But when Benjamin wrote the quoted letter to Gretel, he was interned in what the French authorities called “a camp de travailleurs voluntaires (voluntary workers’ camp),” as Derrida says, and the banality of that arrangement might have lent the dream a more “euphoric” tone.
In this dream, as described by Derrida, Benjamin said the following to himself in French: “Il s’agissait de changer en fichu une poésie” which Elvenin translates as “It was a case of turning poetry into a kerchief”. But Benjamin “translated this as: Es handelte sich darum, aus einem Gedicht ein Halstuch zu machen,” Derrida says, sharing this German translation with his audience, subtly shifting the terms of his address, while adding that “later we will touch on this ‘fichu’, this kerchief or scarf.” And then — notice how he continues with this plural pronoun— “We will discern in it the letter of the alphabet that Benjamin thought he recognised in his dream. And ‘fichu’, as we will come to, is not any old French word to denote a muffler, shawl or women’s scarf.”
Briefly, Derrida discourses on the 'fichu', a word which “means different things according to whether it is being used as a noun or adjective”:
The fichu – and this is the most obvious meaning in Benjamin’s sentence – designates a shawl, the piece of material that a woman may put on in a hurry, around her head or neck. But the adjective fichu denotes evil: that which is bad, lost, condemned. One day in September 1970, seeing his death approaching, my sick father said to me, ‘I'm fichu.’
After drawing the correspondence between his father's use of the handkerchief to say, ‘I'm fed up with it,’ Derrida addresses his audience: “Do we always dream in bed, at night? Are we responsible for our dreams? Can we answer for them? Suppose I am dreaming now. My dream is a happy one, like Benjamin’s.” Using the plural pronoun gathers the audience into the questions, or makes them, so to speak, answerable for the response. The coincidences here are the name and the date, to quote Paul Celan, namely, that the Adorno Prize itself was to occur on Adorno's birthday, September 11th, which in that year coincided with the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.
“I feel I am dreaming—” Derrida tells the audience. To 'feel' that one is dreaming plies the difference between dream and recognition: who am I when I see myself dreaming and what relationship can be said to exist between my dreaming and my personhood? In gently touching this sense of disbelief, Derrida insinuates that the affect isn't limited to the dream as such but related to the confusion between dream and reality, as he seems to suggest in the next line, “Even if the highwayman or the smuggler doesn’t deserve what is happening to him — like the poor student in a Kafka story who believes himself to be called, like Abraham, to the seat reserved for the first in the class — his dream seems happy. Like mine.”
After drawing himself into the Kafka story, and creating parallels between dreams in Prague and dreams along Mount Moriah, Derrida addresses the audience in a series of questions that alight from each other like reflections of pebbling skipping across a lake’s surface. “What is the difference between dreaming and believing that we are dreaming?” Derrida asks the audience:
And, anyway, who has the right to ask that question? The dreamer, plunged deep in his experience of the night, or the dreamer who has woken up? Would a dreamer be able to speak about his dream without waking? Would he know how to name the dream at all? Would he know how to analyse it fairly and even to use the word ‘dream’ knowingly without interrupting and betraying – yes, betraying – sleep?"
[* These happy-seeming dreams remind me of a conversation between Ernest Bloch and Theodor Adorno about utopia. I'm making a note to come back to it later, if the right corridor appears.]
V